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2A- 8 /09 /93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ARNIE NORMAN and JONES BEACH LIFEGUARD 
CORPS - LOCAL 2744, COUNCIL 82, 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12161 
STATE OF NEW YORK (LONG ISLAND STATE PARKS, 
RECREATION AND HISTORICAL PRESERVATION 
COMMISSION), 
Respondent. 
KENNEDY, CASEY & MCCOY (STANLEY Q. CASEY of counsel), for 
Charging Parties 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ. (LAUREN DESOLE of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Arnie Norman 
and the Jones Beach Lifeguard Corps - Local 2744, Council 82 
(Union) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the Union's charge against the 
State of New York (Long Island State Parks, Recreation and 
Historical Preservation Commission) (State) which alleges that 
the State violated §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by first transferring and later 
demoting Norman in retaliation for the Union's refusal to agree 
that there was a problem with the Union's interpretation of 
certain employment practices regarding the scheduling and 
deployment of lifeguards. 
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In his decision, the ALJ confirmed a pre-hearing ruling that 
the charge as it related to events occurring before August 25, 
1990, including Norman's transfer in July 1990, was untimely.-1 
He further found that although Norman, as vice-president of the 
Union, was engaged in protected activities and the State was 
aware of his role, his demotion, effective on August 29, 1990, 
was prompted by his supervisory deficiencies and was not 
improperly motivated. 
The Union argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in his 
finding that Norman's demotion was not improperly motivated. It 
also excepts to his determination that the charge, as it related 
to Norman's transfer, was untimely. The State argues in its 
response that the ALJ's findings are supported by the facts and 
the law, as was his decision that allegations relating to events 
occurring prior to August 24, 1990 were untimely. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ALJ's 
decision. 
Norman was hired as a Captain, the highest supervisory title 
in a unit of seasonal lifeguards-', for the summer of 1990. He 
was assigned to "field", or beach, 2 in Jones Beach State Park on 
Long Island. As a Captain, Norman's responsibilities included 
overseeing the training and conditioning of the lifeguards 
-'Rules of Procedure, §204.1(a), requires charges to be filed 
within four months of the alleged impropriety. 
-
7The lifeguard title series, beginning with the highest rank, is 
Captain, Lieutenant, Boatswain, Lifeguard II and Lifeguard I. 
Board - U-12161 -3 
assigned to his field, ensuring proper coverage of the lifeguard 
stands on his field and monitoring the scheduling and deployment 
of his lifeguards on a daily and weekly basis, including 
completing the requisite paperwork on such scheduling. Early in 
the season, on June 2, 1990, Norman was counselled by his 
supervisor, Joseph Scalise, Water Safety Director for the Long 
Island Region, concerning the timing of a swimming test of a 
lifeguard rehire candidate. On June 16, 1990, Norman was the 
subject of a memo drafted by Chuck Barr, Assistant Coordinator 
Jones Beach State Parks, at Scalise's direction, regarding an 
incident in which a swimming area was left unattended while the 
lifeguards assigned dealt with a submersion. Norman was 
criticized for having inadequate staff scheduled for the shift in 
question. 
On June 28, 1990, there was a drowning at field 2 while 
Norman was on duty. Scalise arrived on the scene almost 
immediately after the incident was reported. Thereafter, he 
generated a written report on the incident, based in large part 
on his own observations and on the reports he received from the 
lifeguards involved, including Norman. On July 1, 1990, he 
transmitted a copy of the report to Michael Asheroff, Deputy 
Regional Director of Long Island State Parks, his supervisor. He 
also sent copies of the report to Ronald Foley, Regional Director 
of Long Island State Parks and Superintendent Lecinski of the 
Jones Beach State Park. Asheroff sent a copy of the report to 
the Department of Health on or about July 2, 1990. 
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Although Norman was not alleged to be responsible for the 
drowning that occurred while field 2 was under his supervision, 
Scalise's report levelled several criticisms at Norman for his 
handling of the response to the drowning and of beach operations 
thereafter.-7 Asheroff gave a draft of Scalise's report to Roy 
Lester, President of the Union, on June 30, 1990. They briefly 
discussed Scalise's recommendation that some kind of administra-
tive action be taken against Norman. Lester thereafter requested 
a second meeting with Asheroff, which was held on July 18, 1990, 
with Norman also in attendance. 
Testimony offered by Asheroff regarding the July 18 meeting 
differed substantially from the testimony of Lester and Norman, 
who testified that Asheroff told them that if they conceded on 
certain points "the report would never see the light of day" and 
that Norman would not be transferred or demoted. Asheroff 
testified that, at the beginning of the meeting, Norman and 
-'These operational concerns involve some differences in the 
State's and the Union's interpretation of certain labor-
management agreements that had been worked out during the winter 
of 1989-90 regarding lifeguards' worktime. Lifeguards are 
assigned to "hour up/hour down" as part of their shifts. Both 
parties agree that, as part of a two-person team, the lifeguards 
are to spend an "hour up" in the lifeguard stand, surveying the 
beach in front of them. The State's position is that the "hour 
down" is to be spent in proximity to the beach, to be available 
as back-up for the lifeguard who is "up". The Union regards the 
"down" time as duty-free time. Similarly, the Union has regarded 
the "half-hour wash-up" at the end of each shift as early release 
time, while the State views it as duty-free time during which the 
lifeguard can shower and change, at the beach, and be available 
in emergencies. On June 28, during the drowning incident, one 
lifeguard who was on "hour down" was not available. Another 
lifeguard had left the beach during his "half-hour wash-up" and 
was, therefore, likewise unavailable. 
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Lester expressed their concern that the matter should go away and 
should be "buried somewhere" Asheroff responded that they 
could view the situation in one of two ways: we could 
either view it as supervisory lapses on Mr. Norman's 
part, or we could take the view that there might be 
something wrong with our administrative procedures and 
our procedural things and that...in which case we 
needed to correct those..... 
He advised the two that Scalise's report had been issued on 
July 2 to the appropriate officials of both the Parks and Health 
Departments. He then noted that, with respect to further action, 
if we were going to take the view of the situation that 
there was something wrong with our administrative 
procedures that we would...there would have to be 
additional follow-up action in which the union would 
have to join as a partner with management in cleaning 
up some of the difficulties that would be as a result 
of our administrative actions. 
Asheroff advised Lester that he had to have something real to 
take back and discuss with his people in terms of what agreements 
had been reached. Lester advised Asheroff the next day that 
management would have to "do what it had to do". Asheroff then 
notified Scalise to take further action to implement the 
recommendations set forth in his report. As a result, Norman and 
the two other lifeguards were transferred in mid-July, all 
without demotion at that time. 
Norman was advised by Scalise at meetings the two had at 
Norman's new assignment that there were still problems that 
Scalise had observed in the way Norman handled scheduling and 
deployment of staff, as well as continuing problems with the way 
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in which Norman interpreted "hour up/hour down".-7 In a letter 
dated August 11, 1990, Scalise confirmed these problems in 
writing to Norman and concluded the letter by directing Norman to 
attend a meeting on August 12 to "discuss his unwillingness or 
inability to perform the job of Captain in the Jones Beach 
Lifeguard Corps." Scalise hand delivered the letter to Norman on 
August 11, 1990, observing when he arrived at the beach that the 
lifeguard stand was vacant and that three lifeguards, including 
Norman, were standing at the base of the stand, engaged in casual 
conversation. The lifeguard who was scheduled to be "up" was 
clearing a prohibited swimming area and Norman advised Scalise 
when questioned that the lifeguard who was "down" was off. 
Scalise noted again that the lifeguard "down" was in fact still 
on duty and that the procedure was that the lifeguard "down" 
should clear the prohibited area while the lifeguard "up" 
remained in the stand. As he was leaving, Scalise noted that as 
the shift changed, the lifeguard who went "up" on the stand was 
not in uniform and that Norman did not say anything to him. 
Norman had filed a "class action" grievance with Scalise on 
August 9 concerning an alleged change in the method of 
calculating personal leave eligibility. Scalise had denied the 
-
70n August 6, 1990, Scalise noted that the lifeguard scheduled 
to be "up" on August 3, 1990, had been allowed to take time to 
jog during that time; Scalise also noted to Norman that overtime 
had improperly been granted on that day to provide adequate 
coverage and requested Norman to give him a written explanation. 
On August 7, 1990, Norman turned in a schedule that listed him 
for a personal leave day on the following weekend. Norman was 
instructed to correct that schedule. 
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grievance on August 13, noting that the eligibility requirements 
were implemented at the Union's request. Apparently no appeal 
from Scalise's determination was filed with the State. 
After the meeting between Scalise and Norman on August 15, 
Scalise wrote to Norman, advising him that, effective August 29, 
1990, he was demoted to Lieutenant for the rest of the 1990 
season because of "a chronic performance deficiency in 
supervision on [Norman's] part" and that unless there were 
vacancies in 1991 for a Lieutenant to report to a Captain, Norman 
would be demoted to Boatswain. Norman appealed Scalise7s 
determination to Asheroff. On August 28, Asheroff confirmed 
Scalise's findings, with the modification that Norman would be 
assigned as a Lieutenant for the 1991 season and, after one year 
of satisfactory service, could again be considered for promotion 
to Captain. 
This charge was filed on December 24, 1990. By letter dated 
January 28, 1991, the assigned ALJ advised the parties in a 
letter transmitting the charge to the State and the Notice of 
Conference to both parties, that the charge was not being 
processed with respect to those incidents which preceded 
August 25, 1990. The ALJ then directed the State to answer the 
charge as described in the transmittal letter. 
DISCUSSION 
Initially, the Union's exceptions to the ALJ's refusal to 
process the charge as to the events occurring before August 25, 
1990, must be addressed. The Union argues that the State waived 
Board - U-12161 
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any timeliness defense because it was not raised in its answer. 
Therefore, the Union argues, the ALJ could not dismiss as 
untimely the allegations relating to Norman's transfer. 
PERB's Rules of Procedure, §204.2(a) provide that the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) 
[s]hall review the charge to determine whether the 
facts as alleged may constitute an improper practice as 
set forth in section 209-a of the act. If it is 
determined that the facts as alleged do not, as a 
matter of law, constitute a violation, or that the 
alleged violation occurred more than four months prior 
to the filing of the charge, it shall be dismissed by 
the director subject to review by the board under 
section 2 04.10(c) of this Part;.... 
An assigned ALJ, as the Director's designee, may confirm the 
Director's determinations to the parties with the initial 
transmittal of the charge and Notice of Conference. Once the 
determination is made by the Director that the charge, or certain 
allegations contained therein, are untimely, a respondent has no 
obligation to raise timeliness as an affirmative defense to them. 
Indeed, in this case, the ALJ specifically instructed the State 
to answer the charge as the ALJ had described it, which included 
only those events which occurred after August 24, 1990. 
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the ruling of the conference ALJ 
and the decision by the hearing ALJ that events which occurred 
prior to August 25, 1990, including Norman's transfer, were not 
timely pled as violations. 
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The Union has established the first two elements of a 
violation of §§209-a.l(a) and (c) .-' Norman, as vice-president 
of the Union, was engaged in protected activities and the State, 
represented by Scalise and Asheroff, knew of these activities. 
However, from our review of the record, the Union has failed to 
establish that Norman's demotion would not have occurred but for 
his union activities. In support of its charge, the Union offered 
the testimony of Lester and Norman that Asheroff had attempted to 
trade Norman's transfer/demotion for concessions from the Union 
on the scheduling and training issues.-1 The ALJ credited 
Asheroff's testimony that he made no such statement. There is 
nothing in the record which would warrant a disturbance of the 
ALT's credibility determination. Asheroff, as a courtesy, showed 
Lester a copy of Scalise's report and recommendations. It was 
Lester who called the subsequent meeting to attempt to resolve 
the issues raised in the report. Asheroff merely outlined the 
two courses of action open to him: either there were supervisory 
lapses on Norman's part which would have to be dealt with, 
possibly by transfer or demotion, or the administrative 
procedures were inadequate and the parties would have to work 
together to clarify the procedures and their implementation. 
Norman was then transferred by Scalise, who had no part in the 
^State of New York (OMH), 24 PERB ^3032 (1991); County of 
Cattaraugus and Sheriff of Cattaraugus County, 24 PERB ^3001 
(1991). 
-''Asheroff was referring to the wash-up time, hour up/hour down 
and training issues which Scalise had addressed in his report. 
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July 18 meeting, and a little over a month later, after repeated 
incidents in which Norman did not follow procedures, Scalise 
demoted him. Asheroff then confirmed Scalise's action, modifying 
somewhat the severity of the demotion. It is clear that neither 
Scalise nor Asheroff harbored any anti-union sentiments and that 
their decisions were motivated by Norman's repeated failure to 
exercise appropriate supervisory responsibility. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Union's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
£Z- u. 
Wal-^ e^ p L. Eisenberg, Membe 
ErJ 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CP-298 
COUNTY OP SCHENECTADY, 
Employer. 
NANCY HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEPKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). CSEA filed a unit 
clarification/placement petition on December 2, 1992, seeking a 
determination that the County of Schenectady's (County) Director 
of Activities and Volunteer Services is in or should be placed in 
CSEA's unit of County employees. 
The Director dismissed CSEA's petition as untimely because 
it could have filed a representation petition in May 1992, a date 
after the position was created and before the clarification/ 
placement petition was filed.-7 In reaching this determination, 
-
7Rules of Procedure (Rules) §201.2(b). Placement petitions may 
not be filed if a representation petition could have been filed 
earlier. Clarification petitions are similarly barred absent all 
parties7 consent, and there is no claim that the County consented 
to the filing of the clarification aspect of the petition. 
Board - CP-298 
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the Director had to consider the effect of the parties' four-year 
contract covering the period from January 1, 1990 through 
December 31, 1993. Relying upon our decision in Kenmore-
Tonawanda Union Free School District-7 (Kenmore), the Director 
held that the parties' contract should be treated for purposes of 
defining the filing periods for representation petitions as a 
three-year agreement followed by a one-year agreement. Thus 
construed, CSEA could have filed a petition seeking to represent 
the in-issue position in May of either 1992 or 1993.-' 
CSEA argues that the Director's decision should be reversed 
because it ignores or defeats the policies of the Act and our 
Rules. It urges us to adopt the rationale in decisions of the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) under which a current 
contract is a bar to a representation petition filed by either of 
the parties to the contract until the filing period, as 
calculated by reference to the contract's expiration date, 
opens.-7 The County has not filed a response to CSEA's 
exceptions. 
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the Director's 
decision. 
The disposition of the timeliness issue presented here 
hinges on the purpose of the contract bar principles which have 
2/12 PERB 53 055 (1979) . 
5/Rules §201. 3 (d) . 
^E.g.. Montgomery Ward & Co.. 137 NLRB No. 26, 50 LRRM 1137 
(1962) . 
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been fashioned by statute, rule and case law. The primary 
purpose of the contract bar is to provide the contracting parties 
a reasonable period of stability in their bargaining relationship 
while still affording the employees an opportunity to change or 
eliminate their bargaining agent, if that be their wish. That 
balance of competing interests is reflected in §208.2 of the Act, 
which provides that contracts in excess of three years are to be 
treated as contracts of three years' duration for purposes of 
fixing a union's period of unchallenged representation status. 
Section 208.2, however, does not render invalid contracts in 
excess of three years duration. Clearly then, the Legislature 
did not intend to restrict the parties to a bargaining 
relationship in their discretion to fix the duration of their 
contract. The limited disruption in the parties' freedom to 
contract represented in §208.2 is, therefore, plainly to give 
effect to the employees' right to a freedom of choice in the 
selection of a bargaining agent. Allowing petitions to be filed 
by employees or an outside union acting on their behalf at the 
prescribed times calculated by reference to the statutory maximum 
contract bar of three years fully protects the employees' rights. 
There is, however, no persuasive rationale which would extend a 
right to petition to either of the contracting parties in advance 
of the filing period defined by reference to the expiration of 
the parties' contract. To do so, as CSEA argues, necessarily 
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allows one of the parties to the relationship to disregard their 
agreement to the duration of the contract.-7 
The implications of a contrary decision become readily 
apparent in the context of this case. The parties would be 
deprived of a nonadversarial determination regarding the unit 
status of an employee which could cause unnecessary litigation, 
possibly in multiple forums. The employee is simultaneously 
denied any realistic opportunity for representation for possibly 
several years. Neither result is consistent with the policies of 
the Act to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships and 
to secure representation for employees in the appropriate unit if 
they desire it. 
A contrary result is not dictated by our decision in 
Kenmore. That decision arose in the context of an improper 
practice charge filed by a nonincumbent union seeking use of the 
employer's property; it did not involve any consideration of the 
question as to whether either of the contracting parties may file 
a representation petition at any time before the eighth month of 
the contract's expiration date. As the issue in this case was 
not presented in Kenmore, we have no occasion to reconsider that 
decision. Similarly, we do not consider the calculation of 
filing periods or the application of contract bar rules in the 
context of agreements in excess of three years duration in 
situations involving petitions filed by other than one of the 
-
7See Town of Kent Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Town of Kent, 42 
A.D. 2d 747,, 6 PERB 57519 (2d Dep't 1973). 
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contracting parties. Moreover, even as to petitions filed by the 
contracting parties, there may be contracts of such unreasonably 
long duration that even those parties must be permitted an 
opportunity to raise representation questions at a time other 
than that calculated by reference to the contract's expiration. 
The four-year contract in this case, however, presents no such 
concerns. We hold, therefore, only that CSEA, as a party to the 
1990-93 contract, could not have filed a representation petition 
with respect to this title in May 1992. As such, its 
clarification/placement petition was not barred. 
By our decision, we honor the parties' agreement, promote 
collective bargaining, give effect to the public employees' 
freedom of choice and avoid results inconsistent with the 
policies of the Act. Such circumstances warrant the processing 
of this petition. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
granted and the Director's decision is reversed. The case is, 
accordingly, remanded to the Director for further proceedings 
consistent with this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, £^ Chairperson 
ft)A^u*~-.2fr- 2 ^ * 4 * ^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mem: 
Eric js. Schmertz, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
"A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12903 
CITY OP SCHENECTADY, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO AND 6RASS0 (KATHLEEN R. DECATALDO of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
ROEMER AND FEATHERST0NHAU6H, P.C. (ELAYNE 6. GOLD of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Schenectady 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to a decision by the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director). After a hearing, the 
Assistant Director dismissed three of four allegations-'' of 
direct dealing in violation of §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by the City of Schenectady 
(City) with PBA unit employees. 
The Assistant Director dismissed the allegation involving 
unit employee R. C. O'Neill on a finding that any discussions 
involving his attendance at a computer program in Florida did not 
-''The Assistant Director found that the City had improperly dealt 
directly with one unit employee regarding training pay. No 
exceptions have been taken to this aspect of the Assistant 
Director's decision. 
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arise from or relate to his employment with the City. O'Neill 
was then a Turnkey in the police department. He had developed a 
computer expertise largely from a personal interest in computers, 
not from any job-related responsibilities. The Assistant 
Director determined that there was no violation of the Act 
because O'Neill had been approached in an individual consultant 
capacity, not as a represented unit employee. He dismissed 
direct dealing allegations regarding firearm training for police 
recruits and similar allegations regarding detectives' scheduling 
on findings that there was no dealing with either group. 
The PBA argues that the Assistant Director incorrectly 
construed its charge, misinterpreted the record in certain 
respects and reached erroneous conclusions of law in dismissing 
its allegations of direct dealing. The City in its response 
argues that the Assistant Director's decision is correct in all 
relevant respects and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision. 
We begin with a brief overview of direct dealing to place 
our disposition of PBA's procedural and substantive exceptions in 
proper perspective. Direct dealing basically involves an 
employer's impermissible bypass of the exclusive bargaining 
agent. Essential to a successful case of direct dealing is proof 
that the employer "negotiated" with an employee or group of 
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employees with a purpose to reach an agreement on the subject 
matter under discussion.-' 
The PBA first argues that its charge alleges both an 
improper direct dealing with unit employees and a unilateral 
grant of extra-contractual benefits. The charge as filed, 
however, is not reasonably read to encompass the latter 
allegation, which is distinct from the former.-7 Any references 
to a grant of benefits in the charge are entirely incidental to 
the direct dealing allegations and appear merely to evidence a 
consequence of that direct dealing. The charge was not litigated 
on the basis of a unilateral grant of benefit and the first 
reference to such an allegation appears in PBA's post-hearing 
brief to the Assistant Director. As the charge as filed did not 
allege a unilateral grant of benefit as a basis for a violation 
of the Act, and as that allegation was not added by amendment to 
the charge, the Assistant Director did not err by limiting the 
charge and his analysis to the direct dealing allegations. 
We also find no material error of fact or law in the 
Assistant Director's decision dismissing the direct dealing 
allegations pertaining to the recruits and the detectives. At 
most, the record shows that the recruits were ordered to attend 
the firearm training. Thus viewed, the City's action might 
^See Town of Huntington, 26 PERB ?[3034 (1993). 
-
7An employer's unilateral grant of benefits to represented 
employees need not involve any exchange of promises or an intent 
to reach an agreement. 
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constitute a unilateral change in practice or a violation of 
contract, but it does not constitute individual dealing with unit 
employees in violation of the Act. The circumstances surrounding 
Captain Patrick Smith's conversations with unit employees in the 
detective division regarding scheduling similarly do not 
establish a direct dealing violation. Smith merely invited the 
employees to make suggestions regarding scheduling, conveyed to 
them the City's position as to the minimally acceptable elements 
of a scheduling plan and offered his opinion regarding the 
interpretation of flex hours in response to an inquiry from some 
of the detectives. Smith specifically told those assembled that 
any scheduling changes had to "go through" the PBA. There was no 
exchange of promises in these conversations, no intent to reach 
any agreement with the unit employees and no bypass of the PBA. 
The allegation of direct dealing involving O'Neill involves 
somewhat closer questions than those involving the recruits or 
the detectives, but we nonetheless affirm the Assistant 
Director's dismissal of this allegation. In dismissing this 
allegation, the Assistant Director assumed that an inquiry by 
Daniel Morrissey, the City's Director of Communications,-7 to 
O'Neill as to whether he would go to Florida to attend a program 
pertaining to a computer software package which the City was 
purchasing if "we could work it out", could constitute direct 
-'Morrissey is not employed in the police department and his 
position is not within that department's organizational 
structure. 
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dealing. The Assistant Director found no other persuasive 
evidence of any direct dealing and from our review of the record 
we are in agreement with that conclusion. We hold that 
Morrissey's simple inquiry to O'Neill as to his willingness to 
attend the Florida program does not constitute individual 
negotiations in violation of the Act. There simply is no 
evidence that the City and O'Neill made any agreements or sought 
to make any agreements in contravention of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement,-/ prevailing practices, or 
PBA's status as the representative of the unit. 
The PBA's remaining exceptions are to certain of the 
Assistant Director's findings of fact and certain statements 
which are inconsequential to his decision or our decision. The 
exceptions in those respects are, accordingly, denied. 
For the reasons set forth above, the PBA's exceptions are 
denied and the Assistant Director's Decision and Order is 
affirmed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, 1^-Chairperson 
lMM<Z— £r/ZtUi*S^. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Membeij? 
-
7An arbitrator has dismissed PBA's contract grievance which 
alleged that the Florida program was "training" required to be 
posted and bid. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
LOCAL 100 0, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, NIAGARA 
COUNTY LOCAL 832, CITY OF LOCKPORT UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13118 
CITY OF LOCKPORT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
A. ANGELO DiMILLO, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Niagara County Local 832, City of Lockport Unit (CSEA) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, 
the ALJ dismissed CSEA's charge against the City of Lockport 
(City) which alleges that the City violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The §209-
a.l(d) refusal to bargain charge is based upon surface bargaining 
allegations and allegations that the City's negotiators were not 
sufficiently empowered to enter agreements. The §209-a.l(e) 
allegation is based upon the City legislature's mandate of a 
health insurance contribution from retirees by an amendment to an 
earlier legislative resolution. 
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The ALJ dismissed the §209-a.l(d) allegations on findings 
that the record did not evidence either surface bargaining or 
that the City's negotiators were not sufficiently empowered. The 
ALT also dismissed any allegation that the City legislature's 
action violated- §205-a. 1(d) of the Act on the ground that a 
legislative body cannot commit a refusal to bargain. The ALJ 
dismissed the §2 09-a.l(e) allegations on the ground that the 
parties' contract was not expired on the date the charge was 
filed. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred as a matter 
of fact and law in dismissing its charge. The City has not 
responded to CSEA's exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered CSEA's arguments, 
we affirm the ALJ's decision dismissing the §2 09-a.l(d) 
allegations, but reverse the dismissal of the §209-a.l(e) 
allegations. 
The ALJ's decision sets forth the standards governing 
bargaining behavior which do not warrant our repetition for they 
are well-recognized and not contested by the parties. The record 
evidences the City's willingness to meet, its discussion of both 
economic and noneconomic issues and a narrowing of open issues by 
agreement or otherwise. The City's articulation of a firm 
position on monetary items, which included a wage, longevity and 
increment freeze consistent with the City's perception of its 
ability to pay, was not inconsistent with its duty to negotiate 
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in good faith as that term is defined-7 and has been 
interpreted.-7 In short, we find insufficient evidence that the 
City bargained without a sincere desire to reach a collective 
agreement and no basis on which to premise any per se breach of 
bargaining duty. ............ 
The ALJ also did not err by dismissing allegations, to 
whatever extent they may have been raised, that the City's 
legislature violated §209-a.l(d). Having no right or duty to 
bargain, a legislative body of government, acting in that 
capacity, cannot violate the bargaining provisions of the Act.-7 
This brings us to the exceptions taken to the ALJ's 
dismissal of the §209-a.l(e) allegations. CSEA argues that an 
improper practice charge may be filed within four months of an 
announcement of a change with a definitive effective date. In 
this case, the legislative resolution was enacted in December 
1991 and had a January 1, 1992 effective date, after expiration 
of the parties' contract. Therefore, CSEA argues that it could 
-
7The Act at §2 04.3 defines the duty to negotiate to include 
meeting at reasonable times, conferral in good faith regarding 
terms and conditions of employment and the negotiation of a 
collective bargaining agreement or questions arising thereunder. 
The duty as defined, however, does not compel "either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 
g7E. q. , Town of Southhampton, 2 PERB 13011 (1969) . 
-
7City of Glens Falls, 24 PERB 13015 (1991); Niagara County 
Legislature and County of Niagara, 16 PERB 13071 (1983) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
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file its §209-a.l(e) charge within four months of enactment of 
the resolution. 
The decisions relied upon by CSEA reflect the basic 
proposition that all improper practice charges must be filed 
-within four months of the statutory impropriety. Therefore, in 
reviewing the ALJ's dismissal of the §209-a.l(e) allegation, we 
must recognize the precise nature of the improper practice as 
defined by the legislature. Section 209-a.l(e) makes it improper 
for a public employer "to refuse to continue all the terms of an 
expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated ...." The 
ALJ dismissed the §209-a.l(e) allegation because on the date the 
charge was filed (on or about December 31, 1991) the parties7 
contract had not yet "expired", the expiration date of the 
contract also being December 31, 1991. We believe that the 
dismissal of this allegation reflects too narrow an 
interpretation of the defined statutory impropriety. 
Accordingly, we reverse this aspect of the ALJ's decision. 
The reference to an "expired agreement" in §209-a.l(e) must 
not be taken out of the context in which that language appears. 
The term "expired agreement" does not necessarily have to be read 
to require, as a condition to the existence of a cognizable cause 
of action, that the parties be without a contract at the date the 
charge is filed. Although an alleged post-expiration change in 
contract terms under a charge itself filed after expiration of 
the contract obviously states a cause of action under §2 09-
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a.1(e), we believe that a cause of action is similarly stated if 
the charging party alleges an action which purports to change the 
terms of an agreement which will become effective upon expiration 
of the agreement. Nothing in §209-a.l(e) suggests that the 
filing date of the charge is the exclusive date by which the 
existence of an "expired agreement" must be tested, although it 
is plainly an appropriate date. Equally appropriate, however, 
and consistent with our cases permitting charges to be filed from 
either an announcement or implementation of a change in 
employment conditions,-7 is the date on which the announced 
action is to take effect. If that date, as here, is after the 
stated duration of the contract, there is an "expired agreement" 
within the meaning of §209-a.l(e). The unqualified, announced 
intention to discontinue a contract term at contract expiration 
plainly constitutes a "refusal to continue" within the meaning of 
§209-a.l(e). Therefore, all elements of a cause of action under 
§209-a.l(e) were satisfied by CSEA's pleading.-7 
Our decision in this respect is consistent with what we 
understand to be the Legislature's intent in enacting §2 09-
a.l(e). Section 209-a.l(e) is intended to create a rough balance 
between the rights of public employers and unions. A union may 
-'See, e.g., Middle Country Teachers Ass'n, 21 PERB ^3012 (1988). 
-
7We would expect, however, and would encourage unions to delay 
filing any §209-a.l(e) charge until the change in contract terms 
is actually implemented after contract expiration because the 
issues are usually more clearly identified at that time. 
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not strike, but neither may the employer change the terms of the 
parties7 last agreement. The well-timed announcement during the 
life of the contract of an intention to discontinue contract 
terms immediately upon contract expiration can impair collective 
bargaining and can create the type of tensions which contribute 
to strikes and other forms of employee unrest as much as the 
discontinuation of those benefits post-expiration. We do not 
consider it reasonable to give an interpretation to §209-a.l(e) 
which would prohibit the latter but permit the former and we 
decline to do so. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed as to the dismissal of the §209-a.l(e) allegation, 
CSEA's exceptions in that respect are granted and that aspect of 
the charge is remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings and 
decision consistent with our decision. In all other respects, 
the ALJ's decision is affirmed and CSEA's exceptions are denied. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 
fUJiC^ "tLXl^ yj 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
)«r Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Rochester 
Police Locust Club, Inc. (Club) to a decision by the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, its improper practice 
charge which alleges, as twice amended, that the City of 
Rochester (City) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it established a Civilian Review 
Board (CRB), thereby changing existing disciplinary procedures. 
The charge, as originally filed, alleged a violation of 
§209-a.l(e). The charge did not allege, however, that the terms 
of an expired agreement had been discontinued by the City. The 
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Club was, therefore, notified by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) that 
the charge was deficient. The Club thereafter filed two 
amendments to its original charge, the first pleading a violation 
of §209-a.l(e) of the Act, but also pleading that the Club and 
the City were parties to a contract which was in effect until 
June 30, 1993. In response to the Assistant Director's notice 
that the charge remained deficient, the Club filed a second 
amendment, withdrawing the alleged §209-a.l(e) violation and 
substituting an allegation that the City had violated §2 09-a.l(d) 
of the Act by unilaterally changing the procedures for 
investigating and adjudicating disciplinary matters involving 
unit members. The amendment referred to Article 2 0 of the 
parties' contract as setting forth the unit members' terms and 
conditions of employment with respect to disciplinary procedures. 
The Director thereafter issued his decision dismissing the charge 
on the basis that PERB does not have jurisdiction to enforce 
contractual provisions or to entertain arguable contract 
violations.-7 
In its exceptions, the Club asserts that it is not asking 
PERB to enforce the contract. Rather, it argues that the City, 
by unilaterally changing the procedures for investigating and 
adjudicating disciplinary matters involving unit members, has 
Act, §205.5(d). 
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unilaterally changed terms and conditions of employment in 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
The jurisdictional limitation set forth in §205.5(d) of the 
Act comes into play if the parties' contract is a reasonably 
arguable source of right to the charging party with respect to 
the subject matter of the charge.-7 It is clear from the Club's 
amendments to the charge and its exceptions that the contract is 
the source of its rights with respect to disciplinary charges and 
procedures for unit members. At several places in its amendment 
adding the §209-a.l(d) allegation, the Club specifically states 
that the creation of the CRB violated the parties' contract.-7 
That the provisions of the contract, and the allegations in the 
charge, deal with a mandatory subject of negotiation does not 
confer upon PERB the jurisdiction denied us by the parties' 
agreement covering those negotiable subjects.-7 
For the reasons set forth above, the Club's exceptions are 
denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations), 
25 PERB ^3041 (1992). 
For example, the Club alleges that "the resolutions creating 
the CRB . . . constitute a unilateral and improper 
imposition of disciplinary standards in violation of the 
labor agreement." 
Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist.. 13 PERB H3014 (1980). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Or Chairperson 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Honeoye 
Central School District (District) to a decision by the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). 
The District filed a petition in November 1992 seeking to remove 
the position of night custodian from an existing unit represented 
by the Honeoye Central School Civil Service Employees' 
Association (Association). The parties' most recent contract 
expired June 30, 1992. The Director dismissed the petition as 
untimely because our Rules of Procedure (Rules) do not permit the 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement to file petitions 
after expiration of their agreement until such time as a new 
window period is fixed by their entry into a successor contract. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the Director 
erred by raising timeliness sua sponte and that the dismissal of 
^ 
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the petition effects irrational results which are inconsistent 
with the uniting criteria in §2 07 of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). 
Having considered the District's arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
Under our existing Rules, the parties to a bargaining 
relationship may file a petition seeking to change the 
composition of an existing unit only in the eighth month 
preceding expiration of their contract.-7 The window period in 
this case was November 1991. After contract expiration, only the 
employer's employees or a challenging labor union may file 
representation petitions.-7 These filing periods are intended 
to avoid any possible interruption or interference by the parties 
in their negotiations for a successor collective bargaining 
agreement while still permitting an opportunity for 
representation questions to be raised by strangers to that 
bargaining relationship.-7 
Although the Association could have raised the untimeliness 
of the petition in its response, the opportunity afforded a party 
to object to the processing of a petition as untimely does not 
1 7 R u l e s , §2 0 1 . 3 (d) . 
2 7 R u l e s , §201 .3 (e) . 
-
7See, e.g., Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 13 PERB f3040 
(1980). 
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divest the Director of the power and duty to dismiss petitions 
which are untimely on their face.-7 As we said in Wappincrers 
Central School Districtf-' our Rules are "not intended to compel 
the Director to accept jurisdiction over untimely petitions by 
reasons of the parties' waiver of the timeliness Rules.11-7 
The statutory uniting criteria are not applicable unless a 
representation question is properly and timely raised. The 
District's petition is untimely and, therefore, the Director 
could not have proceeded to a determination on the merits of the 
petition. 
The District's remaining arguments merely question whether 
( the filing periods clearly established by our Rules are 
reasonable and best effectuate the policies of the Act. These 
arguments are worthy of consideration in the context of our 
continuing examination of our Rules, and we will take them under 
advisement. Changes in our Rules may be appropriate, and in 
affirming the dismissal of the petition as untimely under our 
existing Rules, we make no judgment as to the merit of the 
District's arguments. Until such time, however, as the Rules are 
changed to permit petitions of this type, our existing Rules, as 
consistently interpreted and applied, necessitate dismissal of 
the District's petition. 
^Rules, §201.5(d). 
^20 PERB ?[3043 (1987) . 
• ^Id. at 3 089 n. 1. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 




Walter*. L. Eisenberg, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of 
New York - Unified Court System (UCS) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a multi-day hearing, the 
ALJ held, in relevant part,-7 that UCS violated §209-a.l(c) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on 
September 6, 1990, it informed Jeffrey Pollock, president of the 
Court Officers Benevolent Association of Nassau County, Inc. 
(COBANC), that he would not be eligible for scheduled overtime 
whenever he used a full day of employee organization leave 
(EOL)-7 or was on EOL full time for an extended period. The ALJ 
-
7The ALJ dismissed several other allegations. No exceptions 
have been taken to the ALJ's decision in those respects. 
-
7EOL is uncharged, paid leave from assigned duties to permit an 
, employee to engage in authorized union activities which are 
J listed in the parties7 contract. 
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found that UCS prohibits employees from eligibility for scheduled 
overtime when on EOL either full time for an extended period or 
for a full day.-7' Although finding that this policy was not 
improperly motivated, the ALJ concluded that the policy 
nonetheless violated the Act because it interfered with the 
exercise of employees' contract rights without UCS having a 
colorable claim of corresponding right to restrict or condition 
EOL. As a second theory supporting his finding of violation, the 
ALJ held that EOL could be restricted by UCS only if there was a 
reasonable relationship between the restriction and the 
requirements of Pollock's position, and he found there to be 
none. 
UCS excepts to several of the ALJ's findings of fact and his 
conclusions of law. COBANC has not filed a response to UCS' 
exceptions. 
Full-time EOL is granted, by practice, only to COBANC's 
president. EOL extended to other unit employees may be used for 
part of a day or a full day as necessary up to contractually 
defined maximums.-1 By contract, UCS is required only to use 
its best efforts to accommodate authorized requests for EOL. 
-
7The ALJ did not find any violation regarding UCS' policy and 
practice when EOL is used for only part of a day because 
employees remain eligible for scheduled overtime in that 
circumstance. 
-
7EOL beyond the contractual maximums is repaid by COBANC, 
charged to the employee's annual leave credits or deducted from 
the employee's paycheck. 
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UCS alleges in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in finding 
that employees are ineligible for scheduled overtime when they 
use a full day of EOL. UCS argues that it does not have a policy 
or practice of precluding employees on full-day EOL from working 
scheduled overtime and that the ALJ's finding to the contrary is 
simply incorrect. It admits, however, that Pollock, like others 
who are on a full-time leave from their positions, is not 
eligible for scheduled overtime because UCS considers him and the 
others similarly situated not to be part of its active workforce. 
The ALJ's finding regarding UCS's alleged restrictions on 
overtime eligibility for employees on full-day EOL rests 
substantially upon a conversation between William Brown, Chief 
Clerk of Nassau District Court, and Pollock. Pollock was 
promoted to the position of Court Office-Sergeant in Nassau 
County District Court in March 1990. In June 1990, he assumed 
the presidency of COBANC and was on full-time EOL from June 7 
until early September 1990. Brown had questions about whether 
Pollock should serve a probationary period and about his 
eligibility for scheduled overtime and he addressed these 
questions to Howard Rubenstein, then UCS' Director of Employee 
Relations. With respect to scheduled overtime,^ Rubenstein 
-''Effective September 1, 1990, Pollock was required to report to 
work three days each week to permit UCS to evaluate him in his 
promotional position. Pollock was on EOL two days per week until 
March 1, 1991, when he resumed full-time EOL status. The ALJ did 
not find any violation of the Act in UCS' requirement that 
Pollock serve a probationary period. See also Bertoldi v. 
Kinsella, 186 A.D. 2d 487, 25 PERB f7013 (1st Dep't 1992) (PERB's 
dismissal of similar allegations confirmed). 
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advised Brown that it was not appropriate to assign overtime to a 
person who was on full-time EOL. Brown communicated that 
information to Pollock, but he also told him that he would not be 
eligible for scheduled overtime on any day he used EOL for the 
full day. Pollock subsequently confirmed their conversation by 
letter. 
UCS argues that Brown both misunderstood and misstated to 
Pollock the advice Rubenstein had given to him. It maintains 
that UCS' policy in this respect is that employees are ineligible 
for scheduled overtime only when on full-time EOL or other 
extended leaves of absence. Employees remain eligible for 
scheduled overtime, according to UCS, when on EOL for a full day 
or a part day. 
Having reviewed the record, we find that UCS does not have a 
policy or practice of denying scheduled overtime to employees who 
use EOL on a full day. The record does not show that any 
employee was denied scheduled overtime when on EOL for a full 
day. To the contrary, Pollock himself worked scheduled overtime 
on days on which he used EOL for a full day after his 
conversation with Brown. This was consistent with the many times 
he worked scheduled overtime when on EOL before September 1990. 
The ALT's finding that UCS had an established policy to deny 
employees scheduled overtime when on full-day EOL rests on 
Brown's admitted statement to Pollock that he was not eligible 
for scheduled overtime on any day he used EOL for a full day and 
Pollock's subsequent letter to Brown confirming their 
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conversation. In agreement with UCS, however, we find that 
Brown's statement to Pollock did not represent UCS' policy, but a 
misinterpretation of information and advice given Brown by 
Rubenstein. The discussion between Brown and Rubenstein did not 
concern employees' eligibility for scheduled overtime when they 
used EOL for a full day, only Pollock's overtime eligibility 
because he was on full-time EOL. From our review of the record, 
it is clear that Brown was merely communicating to Pollock what 
he understood to be UCS' existing policy. 
The ALJ also relied upon Rubenstein's testimony that he did 
not think it appropriate for employees who used EOL for a full 
day to be eligible for scheduled overtime. There is no evidence, 
however, that this opinion was communicated to Brown or Pollock 
or was ever adopted as UCS' policy. Given that Pollock worked 
overtime when on full-day EOL, we read Rubenstein's testimony as 
reflecting only his personal opinion, not UCS' policy or 
practice. 
As an additional basis for his conclusion that UCS denied 
scheduled overtime to persons on full-day EOL, the ALJ relied 
upon a statement in UCS' answer admitting that Rubenstein 
informed Brown that Pollock was not eligible for overtime "on 
days when he was absent from work on the basis of employee 
organization leave." We find this admission, however, to be 
ambiguous. It could apply only to the days off during a period 
of full-time EOL, a policy and practice UCS has consistently 
admitted. Given the circumstances in which Brown posed the 
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question to Rubenstein, we consider this, if anything, to be the 
more reasonable interpretation of UCS' answer. 
The ALT also concluded that UCS could not have intended to 
deny overtime eligibility to only persons on full-time EOL 
because Pollock was not going to be on full-time EOL when he was 
told by Brown that he was ineligible for overtime on any day he 
used EOL. This shows, however, only Brown's understanding of 
UCS' policy. Given his understanding, Brown would not have said 
anything else to Pollock. His statement to Pollock, which we 
have concluded was mistaken, does not establish what UCS7 policy 
is in fact. 
Finding that Brown misunderstood and misstated UCS' existing 
policy does not, however, necessarily exonerate UCS. From an 
employee's perspective, there is generally no less potential 
interference with protected rights in being told incorrectly that 
he or she is ineligible for a benefit then in actually being 
denied the benefit.-7 The inaccuracy of Brown's statement, 
however, does not by itself establish any statutory impropriety. 
The statement must also mislead the employee and, thereby, 
impermissibly encourage or discourage the exercise of protected 
rights. -1 
-
7See, e.g. , United Univ. Professions (Barry) , 17 PERB 1(3 061 
(1984) ; United Fed'n of Teachers fBarnett^ . 15 PERB 13103 (1982) ; 
Auburn Administrators Ass'n, 11 PERB 13086 (1978). 
rUnited Univ. Professions, 20 PERB 13056 (1987). 
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In this case, we find that Pollock was not mislead by 
Brown's statement. Pollock, as noted, worked scheduled overtime 
when on EOL for a full day after Brown's statement to him. 
Therefore, neither he nor other employees could have concluded 
reasonably that scheduled overtime was denied them if they used a 
full day of EOL. 
UCS admittedly, however, has a policy and practice of 
denying scheduled overtime to employees on full-time EOL which 
Pollock enjoys by virtue of UCS' practice given his office in 
COBANC. The ALJ found that UCS' policy in this respect violated 
the Act on two different theories. 
Relying upon our decision in County of Albanyr-f the ALJ 
first held that UCS' policy interfered with and discriminated 
against Pollock-7 for his exercise of a clear contract right 
without any colorable claim of corresponding right in UCS to 
condition or restrict overtime on the relinquishment of full-time 
EOL. We find this first theory of liability inapplicable on the 
facts of this case because Pollock's full-time EOL status did not 
derive from the parties' collective agreement, but exclusively 
from UCS' practice. 
^25 PERB f3026 (1992). 
-''The ALT extended this same theory to his finding that UCS also 
denied employees on full-day EOL eligibility for scheduled 
overtime. Having found that UCS did not have a policy or 
practice of denying overtime to employees on full-day EOL, we 
have no occasion to consider the application of this theory of 
liability to the use of full-day EOL. 
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The ALJ also relied upon our decisions in City of 
Rochester^7 and County of Suffolk.^7 The ALJ interpreted 
those decisions to preclude an employer from interfering with an 
employee's authorized union leave time unless there is a 
significant conflict between the leave time and the reasonable 
requirements of the employee's position. To the extent the ALJ 
applied this theory to find UCS in violation of the Act regarding 
Pollock's use of full-time EOL,—7 we reverse. 
UCS denies overtime eligibility to all persons on extended 
leaves of various types regardless of purpose. That policy on 
this record has been consistently applied. The ALJ nonetheless 
held that UCS' nondiscriminatory overtime policy violated the Act 
insofar as it applied to union leave because UCS did not have a 
legitimate reason to condition overtime on relinquishment of 
full-time EOL. This analysis, however, elevates full time union 
leave to a special, statutorily protected class. That was 
neither the intent nor the effect of our decisions in City of 
Rochester or County of Suffolk. Indeed, we made it clear in City 
of Rochester that there is no statutory right to full union 
release time. 
^
719 PERB f3081 (1986) . 
^20 PERB ^3009 (1987) . 
—
7As with the first theory of liability, the ALJ applied this 
second theory to the facts as pertaining to the use of full-day 
EOL. Having found, as noted, that UCS did not prohibit employees 
on full-day EOL from working overtime, we again do not decide the 
application of this second theory of liability to the use of 
full-day EOL. 
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The core rationale of both City of Rochester and County of 
Suffolk is the preservation of choice to the employee. Those 
decisions involved promotional opportunities for employees who 
were active in union affairs, but the rationale is equally 
applicable here. A benefit or opportunity (overtime/promotion) 
may be denied an employee if, by the employee's free choice of a 
different benefit (contractual leave), the employee is unable to 
satisfy the conditions attached to the grant of the benefit or 
opportunity. UCS' policy preserved that choice to Pollock and he 
exercised it. By choosing to avail himself of the full release 
time made available to him by UCS' practice, Pollock removed 
himself totally from UCS' active work force in the sense that he 
was not required or relied upon to perform any job-related duties 
for UCS. All persons in similar circumstances are denied 
eligibility for scheduled overtime. Pollock's union leave 
affords him no special statutory privileges not enjoyed by other 
employees similarly situated. Alternatively, Pollock could have 
chosen not to take full-time EOL and, thereby, maintain his 
eligibility for scheduled overtime. The AU's decision removes 
from the employer any right to subject an employee to that choice 
and from the employee any obligation to make it. Nothing in 
either City of Rochester or County of Suffolk supports either of 
those results. To the contrary, those decisions compel our 
conclusion that Pollock was properly held to the consequence of 
his choice. 
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In summary, neither of the theories advanced by the ALT 
supports a conclusion that UCS' overtime policy as applicable to 
an employee on full-time EOL violated the Act. As UCS7 overtime 
policy is otherwise nondiscriminatory and not improperly 
motivated, there is no basis upon which to conclude that UCS 
violated §209-a.1(c) of the Act. For the reasons set forth 
above, the ALJ's decision is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 
Pau'line"R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mem^r 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 2 64, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4078 
TOWN OF RUSHFORD (HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT), 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 264 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Maintenance Equipment Operators (Part-time and 
Full-time) and Highway Department Laborers. 
Excluded: All other employees (seasonal, clerical and 
managerial). 
Certification - C-4078 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 264. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 
fcj.^Ldfl. 
Pauline R T Kinsella, Cliairperson 
Eric Jr. Schmertz, Member 
/ 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
^ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4082 
FREEPORT HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the CSEA, Inc. Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Full-time and Part-time: Clerk/Typist, Account 
Clerks, Senior Account Clerks, Maintenance 
Helpers, Maintenance Mechanics and Maintenance 
Supervisors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-4082 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the CSEA, Inc. Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 
uline R. Kinsella,' ch Pa la, C airperson 
r, 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member 
3C- 8 /09/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4084 
HEMPSTEAD HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the CSEA, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Maintenance helpers and maintainers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
Certification - C-4084 - 2 -
shall negotiate collectively with the CSEA, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
£L- £ <• 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric Jj/schmertz, Member 
3D" 8 /09/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHOHARIE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
ASSOCIATION/SAANYS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4086 
SCHOHARIE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Schoharie Central 
Administrative Association/SAANYS has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: High School Principal, Elementary School 
Principal, Director of Special Education. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-4086 - 2 -
l 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Schoharie Central 
Administrative Association/SAANYS. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
) 
DATED: August 9, 1993 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
#5A 
Amend §201.2(c) 
(c) Petitions under this section shall be on a form provided by 
the board for this purpose, and signed. Four copies of the 
petition shall be filed with the director. Petition forms will 
be supplied by the director upon request. Prior to the issuance 
of a decision by the director pursuant to section 201.11 of this 
Part, a petition may be withdrawn only with the [consent] 
approval of the director. After the issuance of a decision by 
the director, [the petition may be withdrawn] a representation 
proceeding may be discontinued only with the [consent] approval 
of the board. Requests to the director to withdraw a petition or 
to the board to discontinue a representation proceeding will be 
approved unless to do so.would be inconsistent with the purposes 
and policies of the Act or due process of law. Whenever the 
director [or the board, as the case may be,] approves withdrawal 
of any petition, or the board approves the discontinuation of a 
representation proceeding, the case shall be closed[.] without 
consideration or review of any of the issues raised by the 
petition. 
Amend 204.1(d) 
(d) Amendment and withdrawals. The director or administrative 
law judge designated by the director may permit a charging party 
to amend the charge before, during or after the conclusion of the 
hearing upon such terms as may be deemed just and consistent with 
due process. The charge may be withdrawn by the charging party 
before the issuance of [a final] the dispositive decision and 
recommended order based thereon upon approval by the director. 
Thereafter, the improper practice proceeding may be discontinued 
only with the approval of the board. Requests to the director to 
withdraw an improper practice charge or to the board to 
discontinue an improper practice proceeding will be approved 
unless to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes and 
policies of the Act or due process of law. Whenever the director 
approves the withdrawal of a charge, or the board approves the 
discontinuation of a proceeding, the case will be closed [.] 
without consideration or review of any of the issues raised by 
the charge. 
